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Abstract Uncertainty must be taken into account in all
aspects of ambient intelligence and human decisions and
activities. We investigate how to utilize both probabilistic
and possibilistic sources of information for use in human-
ized decision-making. In particular we examine aspects of
the possibilistic conditioning of probability developed by
Yager. To provide bounding of the resulting probability
analysis of the cases of completely certain and uncertain
probability and possibility distribution are carried out.
Additionally the cases of intermediate uncertainty and a
general case of possibilities are analyzed. The Zadeh
consistency measure is also used to assess these cases. To
consider whether the conditioned probability is more
informative for decision-making, three measures, Shannon
entropy, Gini index and Renyi entropy are used to compare
the original probability distributions and the conditioned
distribution for the cases described.
Keywords Information theory  Decision making 
Possibility theory  Shannon entropy  Gini index  Renyi
entropy  Possibilistic conditioning  Consistency measures
1 Introduction
Uncertainty is pervasive in the ordinary, everyday
activities and decisions of humans. Fuzzy set techniques
have been widely recognized for dealing with uncer-
tainty in ambient intelligence (Acampora and Loia
2008) and human-centric systems (Pedrycz 2010). In
this paper we are interested in a deeper understanding of
such uncertainties and how they can be quantified for
human decision makers.
One aspect that must be considered in particular is
how to deal with the inherent uncertainty involved when
information is aggregated in order to become useful for
decision making. Effective decision-making should be
able to make use of all the available, relevant infor-
mation about such aggregated uncertainty. In this paper
we investigate quantitative measures that can be used to
guide the use of aggregated uncertainty. While there are
a number of possible approaches to aggregate the
uncertainty information that has been gathered, this
paper will examine uncertainty aggregation by the soft
computing approach of possibilistic conditioning of
probability distribution representations using the
approach of Yager (2012). This form of aggregation
makes it very amenable to apply the information mea-
sures we consider in this paper.
To formalize the problem, let V be a discrete variable
taking values in a space X that has both aleatory and epi-
stemic sources of uncertainty (Parsons 2001). Let there be a
probability distribution P: X ? [0, 1] such that pi [ [0, 1], :Pn
i¼1 pi ¼ 1 that models the aleatory uncertainty. Then the
epistemic uncertainty can be modeled by a possibility
distribution (Zadeh 1978) such that P : X ? [0, 1], where
p(xi) gives the possibility that xi is the value of V,
i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n. A usual requirement here is the normality
condition, Maxx [p (x)] = 1, that is at least one element in
X must be a fully possible. Abbreviating our notation so
that pi = p(xi), etc. and pi = p(xi), etc., we have P = {p1,
p2,…pn} and P = {p1, p2,…, pn}.
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In possibilistic conditioning, a function f dependent on
both P and P is used to find a new conditioned probability
distribution such that
f ðP;PÞ ) new P^
where P^ ¼ p^1; p^2; . . .; p^nf g with




A strength of this approach using conditioned probability is
that it also captures Zadeh’s concept of consistency
between the possibility and the original probability distri-
bution. Consistency provides an intuition of concurrence
between the possibility and probability distributions being
aggregated. In Eq. (1), K is identical to Zadeh’s possibility-
probability consistency measure (Zadeh 1978), CZ (P, P);
i.e. CZ (P, P) = K.
As an example of a conditioned probability distri-
bution that could be used to provide guidance to a
decision maker, consider the following military prob-
lem. Over the first decade of the 21st century, a major
cause of casualties in both Iraq and Afghanistan combat
zones has been from improvised explosive devices
(IEDs). Prevention/avoidance of IED attacks is a critical
decision and should be based on assessment of the most
probable placements of IEDs (Benigni and Furrer 2012).
One approach is to consider historical probability dis-
tributions characterizing typical placements sites. Let
the placement sites considered be X1, X2, X3, and X4.
The variable VIED takes values from the space
X = {X1, X2, X3, X4}. For this example, let the
probability distribution for past IED placements be















where the upper halves indicate locations and the lower the
corresponding probabilities.
Typically there may be additional or more current
information based on intelligence reports that are sub-
jective in nature. A possibility distribution could be used to
represent such subjective information. If the intelligence
officials provide their assessment the possibility distribu-















We can now combine these by the possibilistic condition-
ing approach. Using Eq. (1) we have first
K¼ 0:3 1 þ 0:2 0:6 þ 0:4 0:8 þ 0:1 0:2 ¼ 0:76;
Then,
p^1 ¼ 0:3 1=0:76¼ 0:39; . . .; p^4 ¼ 0:1 0:2=0:76¼ 0:03















The issue at hand is does P^IED represent an improved
estimate of the IED locations? In order to provide
intuition and tools to assess this question, this paper will
provide the following discussions, reusing the IED dis-
tributions above as an ongoing numerical example.
Section 2 begins by providing theorems for extreme
case of P, one of absolute certainty and the other of
complete uncertainty. These theorems provide simplifi-
cations, check results and characterize the approach.
The section then continues with combination of two
more general P distributions with for four different
classes of P distributions. In Sect. 3, we assess the
utility of an aggregated uncertainty and to decide if this
aggregation provides more effective information
through consideration of information measures; includ-
ing Shannon entropy, Gini index, and Renyi entropy; to
gauge the aggregated uncertainty. For our on going IED




pi1n pið Þ; ð2Þ
yields for PIED and P^IED
S P^IED
  ¼ 1:13\S PIEDð Þ ¼ 1:28 ð3Þ
These measures for the more generalized analytic cases are
presented here. Section 4 then discusses consistency and
shows that it provides an additional measure that is com-
patible with the information measures from the previous
section. The paper then provides a summary and discussion
of future research in Sect. 5.
2 Aggregation of possibility and probability
by conditioning
To examine the conditioning approach further we formu-
late four distinct cases for the possibility distributions. The
first two, complete certainty, complete uncertainty, repre-
sent the extreme cases of possibility distributions. Then
two intermediate cases, partial certainty and a generalized
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certainty case will be discussed. For each case we provide
instantiations of the cases based on the two extreme
probability distributions, completely certain, Pcc, and
completely uncertain, Pcu. These cases are shown in
Table 1. Additional measures discussed in Sects. 3 and 4
provide guidance for use of the result.
2.1 Case 1: complete certainty
A possibility distribution with exactly one possibility value
equal to 1 and all other values equal 0 represents a com-
pletely certain distribution. Now we will prove the rela-
tionship between such a distribution and the conditioned
probability.
Theorem 1 If a possibility distribution P is completely
certain, then its conditioned probability P^ is completely
certain.
Proof P is completely certain if 9 k such that pk ¼
1; and pi ¼ 0; 8 i 6¼ k: To obtain the conditioned proba-
bility we first calculate K using Eq. (1):
K ¼ pkpk þ
Xn
i 6¼k
pipi ¼ pk  1 þ
Xn
i6¼k
pi  0 ¼ pk
So now we find the conditioned probabilities
p^k ¼pkpk=K ¼ pk  1=pk ¼ 1
p^i ¼pipi=K ¼ pi  0=pk ¼ 0; i 6¼ k
Thus the conditioned probability distribution P^is
P^ ¼ 0; . . .; p^k ¼ 1; . . .0f g
which is a completely certain probability distribution. h
Some of the issues relative to the interpretation of this
result with respect to consistency and conflict will be
discussed in Sect. 4.
2.2 Case 2: complete uncertainty
If there is no distinction that is made on the values of the
variable V by the possibility distribution, we say this implies
complete uncertainty. This is then represented in the distri-
bution by all values equaling 1 as shown in Table 1.
Theorem 2 If a possibility distribution P is completely
uncertain, then its conditioned probability P^ is identical to
the original probability P.
Proof P is completely uncertain if 8i; pi ¼ 1: To obtain








pi  1 ¼ 1
since
Pn
i¼1 pi ¼ 1 for any probability distribution.So now
we find the conditioned probabilities
P^i ¼ pi  pi=K ¼ pi  1=1 ¼ pi
Thus the conditioned probability distribution P^ is
P^ ¼ p1; p2; . . .pnf g ¼ P;
which is the original probability distribution. h
The interpretation of this result is that the possibility
distribution shows no preference for any specific value and
so the default is that the information to be used in a
decision should be that represented by the original
probability distribution. So for the two extreme probability
cases (Table 1) we have respectively:
(a) Pcc :¼ P^ 0; 0; . . .; 0; pt ¼ 1; . . .0f g













2.3 Case 3: intermediate uncertainty
Here we examine the case that falls between complete
certainty and complete uncertainty for a possibility distri-
bution. To represent this we allow m values of P = 1, such
that 1 \ m \ n. For convenience we index these values
from i = 1, so we have for the distribution:
P ¼ 1; 1; . . .1; 0; 0. . .0f g : pi ¼ 1;
i ¼ 1. . .m; pj ¼ 0; j ¼ m þ 1. . .n
Then clearly K = p1 ? p2 ?  ? pm and
p^i ¼ pi  1= p1 þ p2 þ    þ pmð Þ;
i ¼ 1. . .m; p^mþ1 ¼ . . .p^n ¼ 0
In order to understand what happens in this intermediate
uncertainty situation, we will examine the two extreme
Table 1 Possibility and probability distribution cases
Possibility distribution cases
Case 1: complete certainty P ¼ 0; 0. . .; pk ¼ 1; . . .0; 0f g
Case 2: complete uncertainty P ¼ 1; 1; . . .; 1; 1; 1f g
Case 3: intermediate uncertainty P ¼ 1; 1; . . .1; 0; 0. . .0f g
Case 4: generalized possibility
P ¼ 1; w2; w3; . . .; wnf g; 0\wi\1
Probability distribution cases
Case A: complete certainty Pcc ¼ 0; 0. . .; pk ¼ 1; . . .0; 0f g
Case B: complete uncertainty Pcu ¼ 1=n; 1=n; . . .1=n; 1=nf g
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probability distributions being conditioned by this possi-
bility. First for Pcc we have to consider two subcases.
2.3.1 Pcc, Subcase (1); pt = 1; t B m
K ¼ 0  1 þ 0  1 þ    þ pt ¼ 1ð Þ






¼ 1; p^j6¼t ¼ 0
So P^ ¼ f0; 0; . . .; 0; p^t ¼ 1; . . .0g ¼ Pcc
2.3.2 Pcc Subcase (2); pt = 1; t [ m
For this subcase, however, there is a problem since
pt = 0, but pt = 1. This case will be discussed further in
Sect. 4.
2.3.3 Pcu, Complete uncertainty












 1 þ n  m þ 1ð Þð Þ  1
n
 
 0 ¼ m
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; i ¼ 1. . .m












; . . .;
1
m
; p^mþ1 ¼ 0; 0; . . .0
 
Therefore, we have obtained a subset of equally distributed
conditioned probabilities corresponding to the possibilities
that are 1. Note that these equally distributed probabilities
are greater than the 1n values for the initial Pcu. Again, this
is clearly a valid distribution as
Pn
i¼1 p^i ¼ m  1m
 
¼ n  m þ 1ð Þð Þ  0 ¼ 1
2.4 Case 4: Generalized possibility distribution
This is a general case for which we index p1 = 1 and to
capture the situation between complete certainty and
uncertainty we use the weights, 0 \ wi \ 1, for the n - 1
arbitrary possibility values. So from Table 1 this possibility
distribution is:
P ¼ f1; w2; w3; . . .; wng
and for the conditioned probabilities we obtain
K ¼ p1  1 þ
Xn
i¼2




p^1 ¼ p1  1 þ ðp1 + K0Þ;
p^i ¼ pi  wi þ ðp1 + K0Þ; i ¼ 2. . .n
Again we will examine the conditioning of the extreme
probabilities and once more have to consider the subcases
of Pcc




0  wi ¼ 0;
p^1 ¼ 1  1=ð1 þ 0Þ ¼ 1; p^i ¼ 0  wi=ð1 þ 0Þ ¼ 0;
i ¼ 2. . .n
P^ ¼ 1; 0; . . .0f g ¼ Pcc
2.4.2 Pcc subcase (2); t [ 1, pt = 1
We find the conditioned probability here as:
K ¼ 0  1 þ pt  wt þ
Xn
i¼2;i 6¼t
0  wi ¼ wt
p^1 ¼ 0  1=wt ¼ 0;¼ p^t ¼ pt  wt=wt ¼ 1  wt=wt ¼ 1
p^i ¼ 0  wi=wt ¼ 0; i ¼ 2. . .n; i 6¼ t
P^ ¼ f0; 0; . . .; p^t ¼ 1; . . .0g ¼ Pcc
2.4.3 Pcu complete uncertainty







































¼ 2. . .n
Here we can see since 0 \ wi \ 1, then p^1 \ 1 and
p^i \ p^1: Also these conditioned probabilities still sum to 1.
Xn
i¼2
























To consider specific cases for the weights here we look at
an equal distribution of the weights values. In a sense this
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is a default choice. After deciding on which possibility
value to choose as 1, then if there is no preference for the
other values, a default of equal values is reasonable. We
first consider that since there are n-1 weights to be assigned
we use the weight values as
w1 ¼ 1 and wi ¼ 1
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2ðn  1Þ ¼
1
2
þ ðn  1Þ 1







In this section we will consider measures that can be
used to evaluate a conditioned probability distribution
relative to the original probability. Shannon’s entropy
has been a commonly accepted standard for information
metrics; however, the concept of information is so rich
and broad that multiple approaches to the quantification
of information are desirable (Klir 2006; Xu and Er-
dogmuns 2010). Thus, we will also examine other
measures, such as the Gini index and Renyi entropy, in
this section.
3.1 Shannon entropy
Shannon entropy has been the most broadly applied mea-
sure of randomness or information content (Shannon
1948). For a probability distribution P = {p1, p2,…pn} as
was discussed previously in Eq. (2), SðPÞ ¼
Pni¼1 pi1nðpiÞ. The well-known minimum and maximum
values for the Shannon entropy are presented in the context
of our two extreme probability cases.
First for complete certainty, Pcc, we recall that here, for
some t, pt = 1, and so









Note this follows as limp!0þ;p ln p = 0. That is when a
probability distribution represents complete certainty, then
we have no uncertainty, i.e. maximum information.
Then for the case of complete uncertainty represented by
the equi-probable distribution, Pcu, where V i pi = 1/n












ln (1)  ln (n)ð Þ
¼ n  1
n
0  ln (n)ð Þ = ln (n):
That is, when all probabilities are equi-probable, this is the
most unpredictable, uncertain situation and so represents
the minimum information. In summary the range of
Shannon’s entropy for a given probability distribution is:
0 S(P) ln (n) ð4Þ
3.2 Gini Index
The Gini index, G(P), also known as the Gini coefficient, is
a measure of statistical dispersion developed by Gini
(1912), and is defined as




Some practitioners use G(P) versus S(P) since it does not
involve a logarithm, making analytic solutions simpler.
Gini index is used in consideration of inequalities in vari-
ous areas such as economics, ecology and engineering
(Aristondo et al. 2012). A very important application of the
Gini index is as a splitting criterion for decision tree
induction in machine learning and data mining (Breiman
et al. 1984).
It is accepted in practice for diagnostic test selection that
the Shannon and Gini measures are interchangeable (Sent
and van de Gaag 2007). The specific relationship of
Shannon entropy and the Gini index has been discussed in
the literature (Eliazar and Sokolov 2010). Theoretical
support for this practice is provided in Yager’s independent
consideration of alternative measures of entropy (Yager
1995), where he derives the same form for an entropy
measure as the Gini measure.
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Now as done for Shannon entropy, we consider the





i , then since 0 B pi B 1 (0 B pi
2 B 1) and at
least one pi [ 0, 0 \ R B 1. R = 1 only if for some t,
pt = 1. Thus, G(P) [ 0 unless pt = 1 where G(P) = 0.
This is the case for the distribution Pcc, since pt = 1,
pi = 0, i = t. Specifically
G Pccð Þ ¼ 1  ðp2t þ
Xn
i 6¼t
p2i Þ ¼ 1  12 þ 0
  ¼ 0
As for the Shannon entropy this corresponds to no uncer-
tainty and has the same value of 0.
Next we examine the index for the equi-probable dis-
tribution, Pcu, where pi = 1/n for all i.





¼ 1  n 1
(n2Þ ¼ 1 
1
n
¼ n  1
n
Consider the behavior of G(Pcu) as n increases. For
n ¼ 2 pi ¼ 12 ; pj ¼ 12
 	
G Pcuð Þ ¼ 2  1
2
¼ 1=2
Then for n = 10 (pi = 0.1,…, pj = 0.1) we have
G Pcuð Þ ¼ 10  1
10
¼ 9=10
Clearly then for n ? ?, G(P) ? 1. Thus, in the case of an
equiprobable distribution, we have increasing values for
G(Pcu) with n, and in general the range for G(P) is
0G Pð Þ n  1
n
\1 ð6Þ
Now we can use this measure for evaluating our IEDs’
example and compare G(P) for the original and the con-
ditioned probability distributions. First
G PIEDð Þ ¼ 1 0:32 þ 0:22 þ 0:42 þ 0:12
 ¼ 1 0:3¼ 0:7
So for P^
GðP^IEDÞ ¼ 1  0:392 þ 0:162 þ 0:422 þ 0:032
 
¼ 1  0:354 ¼ 0:646
Thus we see that as with the Shannon measure result (3),
based on the Gini index P^
IED
appears again to be more
informative than PIED.
3.3 Application of measures to the four cases
In this section we apply the Shannon and Gini measures to
the original and conditioned probability distributions for
the four possibility distribution cases of Sect. 2.2 and
compare the measures’ values. As both measures have
increasing values with increasing uncertainty, the condi-
tioned probability will be more informative for decision-
making if it’s measure value is less than for the original
probability. We shall see that both measures basically
agree for the cases considered although their specific val-
ues are in different ranges.
3.3.1 Case 1
For the completely certain possibility, we consider only
where there is no conflict and the conditioned proba-
bility is
P^ ¼ 1; 0; . . .0f g
Then we have first for both measures with the distribution
Pcc
SðP^Þ ¼ GðP^Þ ¼ 0 ¼ S Pccð Þ ¼ G Pccð Þ
But for the equi-probable initial distribution Pcu
S Pcuð Þ ¼ ln(n) [ SðP^Þ ¼ 0
G Pcuð Þ ¼ n  1
n
[ GðP^Þ ¼ 0
So the conditioned probability distribution is more infor-
mative in the second case for the probability Pcu.
3.3.2 Case 2
Next for the case of complete possibilistic uncertainty, we
had P^ = P for all the probability distributions and so we
have
SðP^Þ ¼ S Pð Þ and GðP^Þ ¼ G Pð Þ
We can conclude that the conditioned probability distri-
bution P^ is no more informative than the original proba-
bility P since the possibility distribution P does not
contribute any information as it represents complete
uncertainty.
3.3.3 Case 3
Recall this is the intermediate possibility case and here we
consider the probability, Pcc, first for the Shannon measure
and then the Gini index. Since for no conflict P^ ¼
0; 0; . . .; 0; pt ¼ 1; . . .0f g then as before for this
distribution
SðP^Þ ¼ S Pccð Þ ¼ 0 and GðP^Þ ¼ G Pccð Þ ¼ 0
Next for the equi-probable distribution Pcu, the Shannon
measure is
























  m ln mð Þð Þ ¼ ln mð Þ
Now since Pcu is an equi-probable distribution and n [ m
S Pcuð Þ ¼ ln nð Þ[ ln mð Þ ¼ SðP^Þ
Next for the Gini measure



















¼ 1  m  1
m2
Recall G(Pcu) = = 1 - 1/n and since 1 \ m \ n, 1/n \ 1/
m




¼ G Pcuð Þ
Thus we see that by both measures the conditioned prob-
ability is more informative in this case.
3.3.4 Case 4
This is the case of the generalized possibility distribution in
which for Pcc we saw that P^P^ = Pcc. So again we have
SðP^Þ ¼ GðP^Þ ¼ 0 ¼ S Pccð Þ ¼ G Pccð Þ
Next for the other probability distribution, Pcu, we had
obtained for P^ a general expression in terms of the weights
wi. Here we will consider the special case we examined for
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1




Now we can apply our measures to this conditioned dis-

















ln1 ln2ð Þþ n1ð Þ 1












ln 2 þ ln 2 n1ð Þð Þ½ 
For n ¼ 2; SðP^Þ ¼ 1
2
ln 2 þ ln 2 1ð Þð Þ½  ¼ ln 2
¼ S Pð Þ; but for n [ 2
SðP^Þ\ln n ¼ S Pð Þ
Next for the Gini index:










¼ 1  1
4









¼ 3n  4
3n  4
Similar to the Shannon measure for n = 2, the Gini mea-
sure is the same for P and P^








Finally for n [ 2; GðP^Þ ¼ 3n4
4n4 \G Pð Þ ¼ n1n since for
n ¼ 3; GðP^Þ ¼ 5
8
\G Pð Þ ¼ 2
3
, and as n !1; GðP^Þ ! 3
4
;
but G Pð Þ ! 1:
To consider this last case more generally, we examine
the effects of the range of equi-distributed weights. When
wi ? 0, 1 \ i B n, P ? {1, 0,…0}, complete certainty,
and we recall for which case we have seen that the con-
ditioned distribution is more informative. Then if wi ? 1,
1 \ i B n, P ? {1, 1,…1}, the case of complete uncer-
tainty. So the conditioned probability distribution P^ is no
more informative than the original probability P for either
measure.
3.4 Renyi entropy
Renyi (1961,1970) introduced a parameterized family of
entropies as a generalization of Shannon entropy. The
intention was to have the most general approach that pre-
served the additivity property and satisfied the probability
axioms of Kolmogorov. Renyi entropy is
Sa Pð Þ ¼ 1





3.5 Cases of the parameter a
a ¼ 0 : S Pð Þ ¼ ln Pj j—Hartley Entropy (Hartley 1928)
lim a ! 1 : S1 Pð Þ ¼ 
Pn
i¼1
pi  ln pið Þ—Shannon Entropy
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 Collision or quadratic entropy ð7Þ
a !1 : S1 Pð Þ ¼ Min
n
i¼1
ln pið Þ ¼ Max
n
i¼1
ln pið Þ ð8Þ
This last case is the smallest entropy in the Renyi family
and so is the strongest way to obtain an information content
measure. It is never larger than the Shannon entropy. Thus,
the possible ranges of a capture the following:
High a: high probability events
Low a: weight possible events more equally
a ¼ 0; 1 C Hartley or Shannon, respectively
The Hartley entropy is not of great interest here as for all
of our cases here Pj j ¼ jP^j, and we have already considered
the Shannon entropy. Now we consider the values of the S2
measure, Eq. 7, for our two characteristic probabilities. For
Pcc










¼ ln 1 ¼ 0
and for











¼ lnðn  1
n2
Þ
¼  ln 1  ln nð Þð Þ ¼ ln nð Þ
These are the same as the results for the Shannon entropy.
To continue we calculate S2 for our IED example as we
have done for the Shannon entropy and Gini index. So we
have
S2 PIEDð Þ ¼ lnð0:32 þ 0:22 þ 0:42 þ 0:12Þ ¼ ln 0:3ð Þ
¼ 1:20
and for the conditioned probability
S2ðP^IEDÞ ¼ ln 0:392 þ 0:162 þ 0:422 þ 0:032
 
¼ ln 0:356ð Þ ¼ 1:03
Again as for the other two measures, the resulting value for
P^ is less than for P.We want to consider only briefly the
effect of larger values for the parameter a. For example
from Eq. 8 for S? we have
S1 PIEDð Þ ¼ 0:92 [ S1ðP^IEDÞ ¼ 0:87
This continues the evaluation of P^IED being more infor-
mative but we note the difference is somewhat smaller.
Next we can utilize the already determined sum of the
squared probabilities from the Gini measure to evaluate for
the first three possibility cases for S2.
3.5.1 Case 1
For the probability distribution Pcc we see





¼ ln 1 ¼ 0 ¼ S2 Pccð Þ
but for Pcu
S2ðP^Þ ¼ 0\S2 Pcuð Þ ¼ ln nð Þ
3.5.2 Case 2
Since P^ ¼ P;
S2ðP^Þ ¼ 0 ¼ S2 Pccð Þ and S2ðP^Þ ¼ ln nð Þ ¼ S2 Pcuð Þ
3.5.3 Case 3
For the completely certain probability as before,






















Again since m \ n,
S2ðP^Þ ¼ ln mð Þ\ln nð Þ ¼ S2 Pcuð Þ:
So we note that values of S2 in these specific cases are the
same as for the Shannon entropy measure; however, the
exact numeric value obtained for example in Eq. 3 is not
identical so we can conclude there is a close but not exact
relationship between them.
3.6 Example: less informative conditioned probability
Next consider the following example for possibility
and probability distributions in order to illustrate that
not all P^’s are more informative than an initial prob-
ability P. We shall apply our previous information
measures and see that these are consistent in their
assessments. So let the possibility and probability
distributions be:
P ¼ f0:1; 0:1; 1:0; 0:1Þ; P ¼ f0:8; 0:1; 0:05; 0:05Þ
As before we can compute P^
K ¼ 0:8  0:1 þ 0:1  0:1 þ 1:0  0:05 þ 0:1  0:05
¼ 0:08 þ 0:01 þ 0:05 þ 0:005 ¼ 0:145
and
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p^1 ¼ 0:8  0:1=0:145 ¼ 0:552; . . .p^4 ¼ 0:1  0:05=0:145
¼ 0:034
P^ ¼ f 0:552; 0:069; 0:345; 0:034Þ
We can see intuitively that there is some degree of conflict
or lack of consistency between the possibility and proba-
bility distributions. For example for the largest probability,
p1 = 0.8, the possibility is quite low, p1 = 0.1. Then
where p3 = 1.0, we observe the corresponding probability,
p3, is one of two lowest probability values, 0.05.
Now we can assess this situation with the information
measures. Starting with Shannon entropy we have the
smaller entropy for the initial probability distribution:
S Pð Þ ¼ 0:708\SðP^Þ ¼ 0:995
Likewise we can see that the Gini index measure also
yields a similar result for this case involving some degree
of conflict indicating that the conditioned probability P^is
less informative:
G Pð Þ ¼ 1  0:655 ¼ 0:345\GðP^Þ ¼ 1  0:43 ¼ 0:57
Finally we obtain similar results for the Renyi entropies, S2
and S?:
S2 Pð Þ ¼  ln 0:655ð Þ ¼ 0:408\S2ðP^Þ ¼  ln 0:430ð Þ
¼ 0:844
S1 Pð Þ ¼ 0:22\S1ðP^Þ ¼ 0:59
So the information measures are compatible with our
intuitive assessment of the conflict between between P and
P. In the next section when we discuss in some detail
Zadeh’s consistency measure, we can observe this measure
is also indicative of a lower consistency with these
distributions.
4 Consistency evaluations of distributions
In this section, we use Zadah’s consistency measure as
another approach to assess the integration of uncertainty
representations as a supplement to the information mea-
sures of the previous section. We shall see that the measure
yields evaluations compatible with the information mea-
sures of the previous section.
As noted by Sudkamp (1992), a probability–possibility
transformation is a ‘‘purely mechanical manipulation of the
distribution without regard to the underlying problem
domain or evidence’’. It does not by itself provide guidance
of the usefulness of the outcome.
For example, reconsider the result of Theorem 1 with
respect to the initial probability distribution. Let pk be a very
low probability; i.e. represent a ‘‘rare’’ event, 0 \ pk \\1;
however, as we have seen p^k ¼ 1, which indicates that
although the probability was very small, the corresponding
event did actually occur in this particular instance based on
the possibility distribution. Furthermore, if the initial proba-
bility pk was actually 0, then K = 0 and the conditional
probability is ill defined as we have an indeterminate result:
0/0. Clearly, these results by themselves are unhelpful to
decision making and we will see that the consistency mea-
sure reflects this.
There have been a number of approaches to consistency
measures of probability and possibility distributions that
have been proposed (Delgado and Moral 1987; Gupta






is identical to the expression for K in the conditioned
probability approach. This measure does not represent an
inherent relationship but rather represents the intuition that
a lowering of an event’s possibility tends to lower its
probability, but not the converse.
Another consistency measure that appears in the litera-
ture, CDP (P, P), is due to Dubois and Prade (1982, 1983).
Here for every subset A of the space X,
CDP P; Pð Þ ¼ 1 if P Að Þ	 P Að Þ ð10Þ
and is 0 otherwise. This definition is based on the idea that
possibility is the weaker representation for a situation than
probability.
For our purposes, we focus here on CZ as it provides a
range of values to evaluate the idea of consistency as it relates
to the possibilistic conditioning approach. We can note that
the maximum value that CZ P; Pð Þ ¼
Pn
i¼1 pi  pi can
have in general is 1 as
Pn
i¼1 pi = 1 and pi is at most 1. Thus,
the range of CZ is the interval [0…1] where 0 can be con-
sidered as complete inconsistency and 1 complete consis-
tency. In a more general sense we can relate this to the
concept of conflict, of which consistency is only one aspect.
Conflict generally is thought of as involving broader semantic
issues such source reliability and trustworthiness.
Thus, for the case in Theorem 1 where pk = 0 when
pk = 1, evaluation of CZ yields









This result implies that these distributions are indeed
inconsistent, i.e. a total conflict, and we should not expect a
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valid conditional probability distribution to be produced for
such a situation. Resolution of such a conflict can be
managed by considerations of semantic issues such as the
reliability of the underlying information sources.
4.1 Zadeh’s consistency measure, Cz,
for four possibility cases
We will consider comparative evaluation of the consis-
tency cases in a following section some of which show a
conflict. Note that for validity we can check to see that the




CZ P; Pccð Þ ¼ 1  1 þ
Xn
i¼2
0  0 ¼ 1;









For Pcc, this result shows complete consistency that since
only one probability, p1, was considered as possible. For
Pcu, the measure indicates that there is some inconsistency
with Pcu.
Case 2:
For case 2, P(1, 1,…, 1), which is complete uncertainty,
no distinctions are made relative to the probabilities and so
both Pcc and Pcu are consistent with the possibility
distribution.
CZ P; Pccð Þ ¼ 1  1 þ
Xn
i¼2
1  0 ¼ 1;





¼ n  1
n
¼ 1:
Case 3, Pcc subcase 1; pt = 1; t  m
With the intermediate possibility case 3 for Pcc where
pt = 1 and t  m we have
CZ P; Pccð Þ ¼ 1  1 þ
Xm
i¼2
1  0 þ
Xn
i¼mþ1
0  0 ¼ 1;
Case 3, Pcc subcase 2; pt = 1; t [ m
As noted in Sect. 2, there is a problem since pt = 0, but
pt = 1. As a result, we have zero for the consistency
measure,
CZ P; Pð Þ ¼
Xm
i¼1
1  0 þ pt ¼ 1ð Þ  pt ¼ 0ð Þ þ 0  0 ¼ 0:
This result implies that these distributions are completely
inconsistent or in conflict. Thus, no valid conditional
probability distribution can be produced for such a
situation.
Case 3, Pcu Complete uncertainty












Similar to subcase 1 for Pcu, n - m of the original
probabilities are not compatible with the possibility dis-
tribution as reflected in the consistency measure. That is
the inconsistency here is due to the contrast in the n-m
values of P and Pcu.
Case 4, Pcc Subcase 1; t = 1, pt = 1:
Finally for the general possibility case, Case 4, where
P = {1, 0,…, 0},
CZ ¼ 1  1 þ
Xn
i¼2
wi  0 ¼ 1:
Case 4, Pcc Subcase 2; t [ 1, pt = 1:
Since 0 B wi \ 1, we know not all probabilities are
fully represented. Here, all wi [ 0 so we do not have a
conflict as in Case 3, Subcase 2 above since CZ (P,
P) = wt 9 pt = wt; 0 \ wt \ 1
Case 4, Pcu complete uncertainty










þ n  1
n
¼ 1
4.2 Consistency for example distributions
Next let us consider the consistency for the IED example.
For these distributions, if we recall the value of K then we
have
CZðPIED; PIEDÞ ¼ K ¼ 0:3 þ 0:12 þ 0:32 þ 0:02 ¼ 0:76:
We have seen that the values of each of the three infor-
mation measures we have evaluated for P^IED are less than
their values for P IED. At issue is how specific values for
consistency are related to the information measure values.
Relative to the range of CZ, 0.76 is reasonably large. We
can see next how this consistency value compares to the
example of distributions for which the information
assessments were shown to be less informative.
Consider again the possibility and probability distribu-
tions of Sect. 3.5 above. For these we observed that all the
information measures indicated the conditioned probability
P^was less informative than the initial probability P. For
these distributions the consistency measure is
CZðP; PÞ ¼ K ¼ 0:08 þ 0:01 þ 0:05 þ 0:005 ¼ 0:145
Clearly this consistency value is quite low compared to CZ
(PIED, P IED). So we can observe that higher consistency
values are generally correlated with more informative
conditioned probabilities.
Situations like this can occur in many applications. For
example with web assistant agents, uncertainty aggregation
818 P. Elmore et al.
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appears in the integration of information from sources such
as user profiles, proximity-based fuzzy clustering and
knowledge-based discovery (Loia et al. 2006).
5 Summary
Decision makers are constantly faced with making choices
in complex situations for which they have imperfect and
often conflicting information. They have difficult decisions
in making effective use of this information. Typically such
a mix of information has a variety of associated uncer-
tainty, but ultimately the decision maker must come to
specific conclusions or actions based on this. Our research
here has developed preliminary approaches to assist in this
process by providing information theory based quantitative
evaluations to guide decisions.
We have developed exact expressions for conditioned
probability based on the extreme cases, completely certain
and uncertain. For these cases three information measures
were applied and yielded compatible results for comparing
the informativeness of the original versus the conditioned
probability. As well, we carried out the possibilistic con-
ditioning and information evaluations for numeric exam-
ples. Additionally we used the Zadeh consistency measure
and have seen it correlates well with the evaluation results.
We are currently doing research on the aggregations of
both multiple possibility distributions and probability dis-
tributions. This will allow us to potentially take advantage
of such additional information sources before the com-
puting the conditioned probability. Also we are developing
environments to carry out Monte Carlo simulations to test
the conditioning approach and the evaluation measures. We
are investigating ways to apply such simulations to actual
decision-making and assess if more effective outcomes
result when the evaluation measures have indicated that the
conditioned probability is more informative.
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